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A n i n n o v a t i v e d e s i g n f o r s h a r i n g 
information and intelligence is found in the 
form  of network fusion, which encourages 
collaboration across multiple disciplines by 
leveraging technology to  connect the 
unconnected at classified and unclassified 
levels. As terrorists move to  new  methods  of 
attack, law  enforcement and first responders 
must use comprehensive and timely 
information and intelligence to  both 
anticipate  potential threats  and to  ensure a 
high measure of adaptability  in responses. 
This article  defines  network fusion along 
with other architectures for homeland 
security connectivity; explores  the current 
information and intelligence sharing 
challenges; examines how  network fusion 
can enhance fusion centers  as  well as  assist 
emergency responders; and makes several 
recommendations for implementing network 
fusion. Network  fusion provides  an 
opportunity to  bring many unique 
perspectives  together for smarter,  faster and 
cheaper intelligence sharing.
INTRODUCTION
In April of 2004, a surreal meeting took 
place in a small restaurant in Monterey, 
California between a Minneapolis  FBI agent 
and a New  York  City fire  chief. The FBI 
agent described his experience of the days 
leading up to  9/11 and wanting to  obtain a 
search warrant for Zacarias  Moussaoui 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.  He became so  frustrated with the 
system, which did not more aggressively 
pursue a search warrant and lacked any 
urgency for sharing information, that,  at 
one point,  he  blurted out to  his  supervisors 
that he  was “just trying to stop someone 
from  taking a plane and crashing it into  the 
World Trade  Center.” Little did he know  how 
prophetic his statement would turn out to be. 
The 9/11  Commission  Report described the 
month before the attacks as  a “system 
blinking red” with warnings.  Then I told an 
equally distressing story of never being told 
on September 11 about police helicopters’ 
observations  that the top fifteen floors of the 
North Tower,  which I was in,  were “glowing 
red”  with fire  and that the corner of the 
building was starting to buckle.  These 
historical eyewitness  accounts  illustrate  that 
the systems for intelligence and information 
sharing were “blinking red” for 9/11. While 
t h e r e h a v e b e e n i m p r o v e m e n t s i n 
distributing information, some wonder if 
information sharing and collaborative 
systems are still blinking red in today’s 
networked world.1
Many  in  the intelligence and first-
responder  communities would like to believe 
that  commissions, studies,  new  policies,  and 
executive orders have solved the United 
States’ information  and intelligence sharing 
problems.  Yet  “the same enduring  realities 
that  prevented adaptation  before 9/11  have 
stymied adaptation  even  in  the aftermath  of 
tragedy.”2 The problem  is that organizations, 
by  their  command and control  design, are not 
structured for  collaboration. The struggle 
that  ensues is how  to achieve connectivity  for 
sharing information,  within  a  system 
inhibited by  organizations determined to 
pursue disconnectedness as a means for 
power and control. 3  
The disconnect that exists between 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s c r e a t e s i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r i e s ,  w h i c h  p r o d u c e t w o 
consequences.  The first  is the inability  to 
prevent an attack from  occurring.   Without 
information, organizations are helpless to 
stop terrorism.  The second focuses on  an 
organization’s powerlessness to adequately 
mitigate and respond to terrorist  incidents, 
when  there is a  lack  of understanding  of the 
threat  environment.  Terrorism  will continue 
to challenge society  because it cannot  be 
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totally  prevented,  which  necessitates the 
expansion  of our present  information sharing 
and intelligence system  to contain  policies for 
resilience.  
A  new  design for  organizations to share 
information  and intelligence may  be found in 
the form  of network fusion,  which connects 
not only  the law  enforcement and intelligence 
communities for  prevention and protection 
purposes, but also other  key  components of 
the emergency  responder  community  – such 
as fire departments and health  care systems – 
for  mitigation, response,  and recovery  efforts. 
Together  all  organizations can  benefit  from 
and contribute to the critical  mission areas of 
homeland security  through  the power  of 
networks.
Finding new  approaches for  collaboration 
may  be less a  matter  of innovation  and more 
a  matter  of discovering  what  is already  done 
by  organizations. Stephen Cohen and William 
Eimicke from  Columbia  University  observe 
that  organizations are becoming increasingly 
connected through  inter-organizational 
networks. 4  They  argue that  government is 
m o v i n g a w a y  f r o m  t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
hierarchical  model that  dominated the 
twentieth  century  and toward a  more fluid 
continuum  of organizational collaboration.5 
This trend means that  organizations now  are 
more likely  to be connected horizontally  and 
look outward toward other  organizations for 
necessary  functions. The ultimate goal of 
networked government organizations is the 
production of public value greater  than  any 
one organization could accomplish alone. 6
The fusing  of information  for  intelligence 
sharing is the goal for  some centrally 
controlled systems; however, sharing 
information  is more likely  to occur  when 
organizations are arranged as members of an 
integrated network, which  transcends 
traditional organizational boundaries for  a 
faster  and smarter understanding of the 
threat  environment. This article defines 
network fusion  along with  other architectures 
for  homeland security  connectivity; explores 
the current information  and intelligence 
sharing  challenges; examines how  network 
fusion, as well as competitive forces,  will 
strategically  shape fusion  centers; and makes 
several recommendations for  implementing 
network fusion.
DEFINING NETWORK FUSION
Network fusion  is an  information sharing 
s y s t e m  t h a t  f u s e s i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d 
intelligence from  multiple sources to allow 
decision  makers to better  adapt  to a changing 
threat  environment. It  leverages technology 
to improve awareness and collaboration 
across different disciplines by  connecting 
voice,  video, and data  communications at 
classified and unclassified levels. Networks 
bridge gaps,  strengthen  relationships,  and 
allow  for  innovation,  speed, and flexibility  in 
exchanging  critical information. 7 Through  the 
use of collaborative technology, network 
fusion  is a framework for  linking  multiple 
systems for  pushing  and pulling information 
and intelligence.  It  provides a  platform  for 
connecting  disparate organizations and their 
unique viewpoints.
In  a  networked world, fusion  centers, 
created for  the sharing of information  and 
intelligence, as well as other  critical 
information  nodes, will  have to change their 
shape from  a  strictly  hierarchical, linear, or 
unidirectional hub-and-spoke network  to that 
of a  network platform  that can connect  and 
fuse information  from  many  different  sources 
rather  than  only  those co-located with  them. 
Christopher  Bellavita,  who teaches at  the 
Naval Postgraduate School, contends that 
fusion  centers are examples of an  emergent 
approach  to homeland security. They  were 
first  started post  9/11  at  the state level, to 
bring people together  for  better  information 
sharing.  However,  “fusion”  means more than 
simply  putting people from  different agencies 
in  the same room; it requires the fusing  of 
information,  which  represents continuing 
evolution of fusion centers. 8
The future of fusion  centers will  depend 
on  their  ability  to collaborate  with other 
organizations for  prevention and response as 
well  as their  capacity  for  information to be 
pushed and pulled in  real time through 
networking. Successful network fusion has 
three distinct advantages:
• Faster  to communicate directly  with 
decision  makers and those closest  to the 
 information; 
• Smarter  to understand the threat 
e n v i r o n m e n t  t h r o u g h  m u l t i p l e 
perspectives;
PFEIFER, NETWORK FUSION  2
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 17 (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
• Cheaper  to collaborate virtually  rather 
than co-locate.
Network  fusion  exploits technology  to 
quickly  connect various organizations that 
participate in  homeland security  to exchange 
critical information, insights into potential 
attacks, and real-time situational awareness 
reports. Its effectiveness lies in  the speed 
with  which  it connects decision  makers who 
are close to the information  with  others 
throughout  the network. Secure video 
conferencing eliminates travel  time, which 
speeds up the network  of information 
exchange. “Fast  information  is better  than 
slow,”  which  is the core philosophy  of major 
corporate  information  companies, like 
Google. 9  Failure to consider  the speed of 
network fusion  as part of the intelligence and 
information  process will  greatly  retard the 
ability  to prevent  and respond to terrorist 
threats and disasters.
John  Arquilla, associate professor  at the 
Naval Postgraduate  School,  maintains that 
the fight  against  terrorism  “depends to some 
extent on  technological  innovation, but 
mainly  on a  willingness to innovate 
organizationally  and doctrinally,  perhaps 
especially  by  building  new  mechanisms for 
inter-agency  and multi-jurisdictional 
cooperation.” 10 The Markle Foundation  Task 
Force supports this conclusion by  further 
arguing  that  traditional  information  sharing 
prior  to September 11  contributed to a lack  of 
terrorism  prevention  and preparedness and 
recommends “network architecture” as a 
corrective measure.11
As terrorists move to employ  new  methods 
of attack,  law  enforcement and first 
responders must use comprehensive and 
timely  intelligence to anticipate potential 
threats and to ensure a  high  measure of 
adaptability  in  their  responses.  System 
adaptability  occurs when  multiple  insights or 
a  diversity  of viewpoints “enables people to 
see different things when  they  view  the same 
event.” 12  The fusing of insights from  the 
intelligence community  – law  enforcement, 
the fire  service, health  care organizations, 
transportation  systems, environmental 
protection  agencies,  and other organizations 
– provides an  opportunity  to bring  many 
unique perspectives together  for  smarter 
overall analysis.
While  senior  decision  makers in  these 
aforementioned organizations normally  do 
not sit  in  fusion  centers, or  occupy  seats in 
emergency  operations centers, such decision 
makers would add valuable experience, 
analysis,  and intuition  to the interpretation  of 
reports if they  were part  of the information-
fusing process.  By  connecting  to a sundry  of 
perspectives,  network fusion  leverages the 
knowledge of senior  executives to form  a 
smarter  understanding  of the threat 
environment. 
EXISTING NETWORKS
It is not enough to create faster  and smarter 
ways of enhancing information sharing; such 
methods also must  have sustainable price 
tags.  The cost  of physical co-location  is 
$200,000  per  year, per  person.13 If a  position 
is to be covered twenty-four  hours a  day, 
seven  days a  week, the economic impact is 
one million  dollars per year.  Add to this 
several different  operations centers,  and the 
cost  is staggering and unsustainable. In 
addit ion, having  scores of agencies 
represented in one location  imposes space 
constraints. It is impossible for  every  agency 
to have a  seat  at  the table in  a  fusion center; 
the size of the facility  would be enormous and 
cost  for  personnel  would be prohibitive.  The 
solution  is one of network fusion,  which 
utilizes new  and existing networks to extend 
the reach  of fusion  centers to emergency 
responders.
The development of network  fusion  for 
faster,  smarter,  and cheaper  information 
sharing  and collaboration  will require a 
sociotechnical  approach  that  makes use of 
hard and soft systems. Technical or  hard 
systems draw  on  technology  to assist  in 
connecting  security  partners to information 
and intelligence.  For  agencies working  with 
the Department  of Homeland Security 
(DHS),  information  is exchanged through  e-
mail,  Web posts, phone calls,  and video 
conferences. Unclassified methods for 
information  exchange use the Homeland 
Security  Information  Network (HSIN) 
platform, while classified information  moves 
primarily  over the Homeland Security  Data 
Network (HSDN).  Working with  the 
Department of Homeland Security, first 
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responders can  utilize the  technology  of hard 
systems for  vo ice ,  v ideo,  and data 
communications to exchange classified and 
unclassified intelligence in  a  timely  manner 
over secure systems.
New  York  City  has created an  unclassified 
community-of-interest  Web portal  on  HSIN 
called the New  York  Situational Awareness 
Program  (NYSAP).  More than forty-five 
agencies participate in  this collaborative 
environment  for organizations to post  and 
receive information  and share real-time 
situational  awareness.  When the East  Coast 
was hit  by  Hurricane Irene in  2011,  critical 
information  on flooding,  downed trees,  and 
people in  need of assistance was shared 
among  agencies using  NYSAP,  which enabled 
New  York City  to take immediate steps to 
respond and recover  from  this natural 
disaster. Work is also under  way  to create 
better  collaborative tools to illustrate 
information in graphic form.
Social or  soft  systems are often  overlooked 
when  developing  networks. These are the 
functional skills and qualifications needed for 
collaboration  when  dealing  with  classified 
information.  Major  organizations that  are at 
risk from  terrorism  and acting  as critical 
network nodes,  or are connected to fusion 
centers and the Joint Terrorism  Task  Force, 
need personnel to receive information  within 
the security  domains of top secret,  secret, and 
sensitive but  unclassified. DHS has made a 
commitment  to work  with  first  responders in 
providing clearances and training  as part of a 
s y s t e m  f o r  i n t e l l i g e n c e b a s e d o n 
organizational need, risk, and capability.
Types of Networks
HIERARCHICAL 
Linear pushing of information
CO-LOCATED LIAISONS 
Multiple agencies are co-located 
HUB-AND-SPOKE
Pushing information from a central node
NETWORK FUSION
Using technology to connect and 
collaboration
Table 1: Four types of information and intelligent sharing systems.
HIERARCHICAL LINEAR SYSTEMS
Linear  information  networks are illustrated 
by  information moving from  first  the federal 
to state level,  then  to local  and tribal entities, 
and then  to individual agencies based on  a 
priority  list. This type of network should be 
evaluated for  a  single point  of failure and for 
bias when the system  is stressed. Too often 
the flow  of information through  many 
successive levels is slow.  There are also 
occasions when organizations tend to hold 
information  to flex  their  power. Asking first 
responders to respond to terrorist  incidents 
without  current  information and intelligence 
is like asking  a  pilot  to fly  without 
instruments or  weather  reports. A  lack of 
information  places first  responders at a  huge 
disadvantage when  performing lifesaving 
rescues at extreme events.
However,  there are narrowly  defined 
incidents in  which  only  a  small group of 
people is supplied with  information.  Navy 
Seal Team  Six  and limited government 
officials were the only  people who knew 
about  the raid on  Osama Bin  Laden’s 
compound. In  this case,  a  hierarchical,  linear 
system  was used to ensure security.  But  to 
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locate Bin  Laden, it  took  a  large network. 
Leaders should not be limited to one type of 
network. Rather,  they  should consider  “how 
well  [a network’s]  structure is adapted to the 
activities the organization  carries out and the 
environment in which it carries it out.”14
HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEMS
The DHS has plans for  seventy-seven fusion 
centers around the United States. One center 
is designated for  each  state, with  a  number  of 
metropolitan  areas having  their  own  regional 
centers. These centers are designed as hub-
and-spoke networks,  where each  fusion 
center  acts as a  hub and connects to various 
security  partners as though  the spokes of a 
wheel. Information flows primarily  out  of the 
hub and connects directly  to spoke agencies. 
Hub-and-spoke networks are effective in 
spreading information to the overall  network 
by  pushing  information  from  a  centralized 
location.
The potential  drawback  of these networks 
is their  inability  to handle the bidirectional 
exchange of information  in  a  timely  manner. 
Similar  to an  airport  terminal,  such  networks 
have limited capacity  during peak traffic 
times. 15 The convergence of information  may 
cause the network to slow  down during 
c r i t i c a l  m o m e n t s a n d b e c o m e s o 
overwhelmed that information  does not  get 
exchanged in  a  timely  manner. To avoid such 
congestion,  this type of system  only  pushes 
information  to agencies,  with little room  for 
tailoring  the information  to the end user.  It 
also may  not recognize the need to 
disseminate information  to others than  law 
enforcement  agencies.  The real danger  is for 
a  hub-and-spoke network  to become a 
modernized informational stovepipe,  where 
information  originates from  a  place of limited 
perspective and is pushed only  when the 
originating  agency  deems it  necessary  to do 
so.
Another  example of a  hub-and-spoke 
network is the video surveillance systems that 
have proliferated around many  cities. Cities 
such  as Los Angeles,  London, and Beijing 
currently  provide thousands of camera feeds 
into fire, police, and city  emergency 
operations centers.  Video feeds are selected 
by  these operation  centers to assist in 
acquiring  better  situational  awareness. 
However, the weakness of this type of 
network is seen  when information cannot be 
pulled or  is not  provided by  the controlling 
agency.
CO-LOCATED LIAISON SYSTEM
With  grant  money  from  DHS and working 
with  the private sector, the New  York City 
Police Department  (NYPD) has as many  as 
2,000 cameras feeding  into their  Lower 
Manhattan Security  Initiative (LMSI). These 
cameras can  provide critical  images to 
criminal investigators and could assist 
decision  makers if multiple terrorist attacks 
(such  as those seen  in Mumbai) were to 
occur.
Requests by  the Office of Emergency 
M a n a g e m e n t  ( O E M ) a n d t h e F i r e 
Department of New  York (FDNY) to receive 
live-feed video from  LMSI to their  emergency 
operations centers were repeatedly  turned 
down by  the NYPD. Alternatively,  OEM and 
FDNY were invited to send a  liaison  to LMSI. 
However,  this does not  provide direct viewing 
of live video by  senior  decision  makers. 
Instead,  information  has to be relayed by  a 
lower-ranking liaison, by  voice only.  A  liaison 
system  often fails to get  the right  information 
to the right people at the right time. 
Yet,  many  local and federal government 
programs see a  liaison  system  of co-location 
as the only  collaborative structure available 
for  information  exchange.   While there is 
value in  face-to-face collaboration  and 
analysis,  at  times these co-located liaison 
systems consist of individuals or  groups who 
act  in  parallel  and do not  generate unique 
ideas to increase collective value. If groups 
are not designed with  shared responsibility 
and accountability,  the liaison  system  can 
underperform. 16
NETWORK FUSION
The struggle for  information  sharing  in  a 
networked world is to provide not  just a  seat 
at  the table, but to have real-time information 
provided directly  to decision  makers. It does 
not matter  who controls the raw  data  but how 
organizations and individuals can connect  to 
extract the information  needed to make 
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critical decisions, “because all of us are better 
than  any  one of us at  understanding what  the 
data is saying.”17
The lack of a  robust multichannel system 
for  information and intelligence sharing 
points to a system  that  is still  “blinking red.” 
To avoid such  limitation,  collectors and 
consumers of intelligence and information 
should enhance their  current systems of co-
locating  people by  having a  network fusion 
mechanism  for  pull ing and pushing 
information. However,  as agencies adopt a 
network approach  to information  and 





The Homeland Security  Act  of 2002  and the 
Int e l l ig e nc e Re f o rm  and Te rro r is m 
Prevention  Act  of 2004  were written  in 
response to a  need for  improved information 
and intelligence sharing.  These acts were 
later  strengthened by  the issuance of a 2005 
presidential  memorandum  establishing 
guidelines and requirements for  a  new 
information-sharing environment. 18  Even 
with  such initiatives,  the United States 
Government  Accountability  Office (GAO) 
concluded: “the nation sti l l  lacks a 
government wide policy  and processes 
needed to build an  integrated terrorism-
related,  information-sharing  road map, but 
small-scale sharing initiatives are under 
way.” 19 The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (2007),  the National Response 
F r a m e w o r k ( 2 0 0 8 )  a n d N a t i o n a l 
Preparedness  Goals  (2011) continue to 
highlight  the importance of creating  a  culture 
o f preparedness and d isseminat ing 
information  to enable first responders to 
better  manage incidents and minimize 
damage.20  A dynamic and unpredictable 
threat  environment  requires leaders to 
constantly  evaluate their  organizational 
structure for better ways to collaborate. 
Sharing of information  and intelligence 
among  different  agencies through  networks 
creates a  system-wide understanding of the 
threat  environment. If information  sharing 
fails, the ability  of some agencies to make 
sense of the threat environment  also fails. 
Lacking  the relevant information  to form  a 
system-wide analysis of a threat  environment 
could mean  that individual  agencies make 
separate decisions that, although appropriate 
for  that  agency,  may  conflict  with  the system-
wide goal  and thus prove adverse to that 
agency  as well  as to other  units within  the 
system. 21 The fusion center  model strives to 
provide a  comprehensive picture of the threat 
environment to lessen  potential system 
failure; yet  organizations tend to self organize 
and share intelligence in  functional areas of 
prevention and protection,  ignoring  the need 
for  intelligence for  mitigation,  response,  and 
recovery.  Sharing intelligence for  only 
prevention will surely  lead to the next 
surprise attack if a  plot cannot  be disrupted. 
However,  using  intelligence to also mitigate 
and respond to potential  attacks will lessen 
the consequences and avoid the element  of 
surprise.  Since there is no such  thing  as a 
perfect  defense against terrorism, homeland 
security  agencies must prepare for  a  range of 
potential terrorist attacks and work  together 
to diminish the effects of uncertainty.
In  Bak’s  Sand Pile and a  similar  article in 
Homeland Security  Affairs, Ted Lewis 
describes complex  adaptive systems as being 
self-organizing: as these systems become 
more efficient and connected they  reach a 
state of self-organized criticality  (SOC) or  the 
point  where they  collapse unexpectedly.22 
Based on  this argument,  fusion  centers that 
have self-organized into law  enforcement-
only  centers with  limited central  hubs for 
information  may  be hitting  the point  of 
criticality.  What  was once a well-intentioned 
idea  for  sharing intelligence has mutated,  for 
some, into tightly  connected criminal 
investigation  fiefdoms that exclude those 
outside of law  enforcement.  On a  more 
positive note, lecturer Paul Cilliers argues 
that  the edge of criticality  is the point  at 
which  systems can  change with  the least 
amount of effort.23  The challenge for 
adaptation  is to bridge information  gaps and 
overcome organizational biases. 
INFORMATION GAPS AND HOLES
Examining how  networks function  provides 
clues for  identifying  gaps and reengineering 
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intelligence sharing  in  terms of network 
fusion. The key  building blocks of networks 
are the connections between  organizations, 
which  are referred to as ties.  Social network 
research  literature focuses on  ties and 
bridging gaps between  organizations. 
Opportunities for  information  sharing  are 
dependent  on  the formation  of these ties as a 
fundamental first  step for  creating  a  network 
model.
Having a  multiplicity  of ties between 
organizations will  increase the chances for 
finding new  information. According  to 
Ronald Burt,  professor  at Chicago University, 
these ties span structural  holes or  gaps when 
there are two or  more nodes that do not 
communicate available information.24  The 
structural hole argument  describes the 
negotiation  of connections that bridge gaps to 
join  otherwise disconnected people and 
information  systems.25 Two design principles 
are involved for  an  optimized network  to 
create efficiency  and effectiveness. 26 The first 
principle is to connect  different non-
redundant nodes to maximize diversity  of 
information. The second principle is to use 
these contacts as a  portal  to others in  a 
cluster.  Instead of maintaining  relations with 
all  contacts, an  optimized network delegates 
the maintenance of clusters to the primary 
contacts.27  In  this way, one organization  is 
able to connect  with  many  organizations. 
Fusion  is about connecting  to individuals and 
organizational  clusters to take full  advantage 
of available information.
When the small  plane of the Yankees 
pitcher  Cory  Lidel  crashed into a  Manhattan 
high-rise in  October  2006, first  responders 
needed critical information  in  order to 
respond appropriately. They  needed to know 
if this plane crash  had any  nexus to terrorism, 
if it  was an  isolated accident or  one in  a  series 
of attacks, and if the specific building  was 
prone to fire or  collapse. Homeland Security 
officials in  Washington  also needed to have 
situational  awareness about  the incident and 
the extent  of the fire.  During this incident 
there  were structural holes between  the 
National Operations Center  and New  York 
City’s first  responders. The formal system  for 
information  exchange was slow  to react 
because of these holes in  the network as well 
as inadequate technology. However,  an 
informal and hastily  formed information-
sharing  network bridged those gaps to 
quickly  provide critical information  from  the 
scene.  This incident  illustrates the value of 
having  many  ties and the need to formally 
bridge holes between organizations.
M o r t o n  H a n s e n ,  p r o f e s s o r  o f 
entrepreneurship,  argues that  social research 
has concentrated too much  on  the ability  of 
ties to access novel information  and not 
enough  on the transfer of complex  forms of 
knowledge.28  He claims that  complex 
k n o w l e d g e i s b e s t t r a n s f e r r e d b y 
strengthening ties among different  groups. 
The lack of interagency  cooperation between 
organizations responding  to 9/11  seems to 
support  the hypothesis that  weak ties 
inhibited these agencies from  exchanging 
information. Understanding why  weak ties 
may  not  always span  across groups during 
complex  incidents is critical to building 
networks for information fusion.
ORGANIZATIONAL BIASES
The 9/11 Commission Report warns that  the 
biggest  impediment  to an  all-source analysis 
of intelligence needed to connect  the dots of a 
terrorist  plot is the human  or  systemic 
resistance to information  sharing. 29  This 
develops as the tendency  to look  inward 
toward members of the same organization 
and avoid looking  outward to other  groups, 
thus creating organizational bias.30  People 
are naturally  prone to gravitate towards and 
give more information to members of their 
own  organization and less information  to 
outsiders.  
As the stress and complexity  of a  crisis 
increase, people tend to focus on aspects 
judged most important to themselves and 
their  agency.31  Daniel  Kahneman  describes 
this as a  case of “what you  see is all  there 
is”  (WYSIATI). 32 Often  organizations fail  to 
allow  for  other  possibilities, by  turning 
inward.  They  create a  positive in-group bias 
in  favor  of those who are part  of the same 
group and a  negative out-group bias against 
those who are part  of an  alternate group.33 
The events of 9/11  illustrated that the CIA 
and FBI,  as well  as first  responders,  did not 
realize how  little information  they  had nor 
did they  understand how  the information 
they had could have assisted other agencies.
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When people suffer  from  organizational 
bias,  they  frequently  feel little obligation  to 
exchange valuable information  with  those 
outside their  group, since responsibility  for 
acting  is diffused across the in-group.  This 
phenomenon  excludes the out-group from 
receiving  information  that  may  be vital to its 
operation. The intelligence community 
traditionally  views first responders as the 
outsiders; this organizational bias must  be 
overcome when  creating  an intelligence 
network model. In  a  networked world, it  is 
critical to strengthen  ties and connections to 
law  enforcement and first  responders by 
developing trust  and eliminating  biases for 
information  sharing and collaboration. 
Overcoming  organizational bias increases the 
flow  of information, which  contributes to 
overall  prevention  and preparedness by 
anticipating  potential attacks and building 
resilient systems to reduce negative effects.
MITIGATION NEGLECT
Another  form  of bias is mitigation neglect – 
or  neglecting to share relevant  information 
with  those who must respond to and mitigate 
the effects of an  event.  To optimize homeland 
security  efforts, law  enforcement  agencies 
and first  responders must comprehend 
threats, assess vulnerabilities,  and determine 
the impact  of possible  terrorist  incidents. 
They  also must  be willing  to set aside the 
convent ional mindset  that  be l ieves 
inte l l igence is only  for  prevention. 
Information  sharing  through  a  network 
model can strengthen prevention  and 
m i t i g a t i o n e f f o r t s b y  i n c r e a s i n g 
understanding  of the threat  and working 
collaboratively  to detect  and lessen  the 
consequences of an attack.
One tactic  of terrorists is to conduct a 
sequenced attack, using  a  small  explosion  or 
fire to lure first responders and/or  passersby 
to the scene of an  incident,  only  to cause 
maximum  injury  and fatality  with  a 
secondary  explosive device.  In  2002  in Bali, 
Indonesia, a  backpack explosive was used 
inside a nightclub to drive occupants outside, 
where a  more powerful vehicle-borne 
improved explosive device (VBIED) was 
detonated and killed 202  people. While  the 
intelligence community  works hard to 
prevent such  events from  occurring, it  has 
neglected the need for first  responders to 
have intelligence to understand the potential 
threat environment.
On December  11, 2010,  a  car  fire was used 
in a  busy  shopping  area  in  Stockholm, 
Sweden,  to attract  first  responders to a  car 
where an  improvised explosive device was to 
be set  off remotely.  Fortunately,  this attack 
on  first  responders failed.  However,  it  took 
more than six  weeks for  the FDNY to learn  of 
the VBIED car  fire in Stockholm  that  put 
firefighters at  risk. This delay  in  information 
and intelligence sharing  to first  responders is 
an  indication  of mitigation  neglect  by  those 
who are responsible for  sharing intelligence. 
Mitigation, or  the lessening  of effects before, 
during, and after  an  event,  validates first 




Intelligence is the process by  which raw  data 
is collected and transformed into usable 
information, and then disseminated to end 
users at  the strategic,  operational,  and 
tactical levels. 34  Mark Lowenthal describes 
the intelligence process of collecting 
information  as meaningless unless analysts 
can  turn information  into reports and briefs, 
which  are usable by  consumers, thus creating 
value. 35  Creating true value for  all  consumers 
of intelligence requires a  strategy  that  goes 
beyond just  creating reports and incorporates 
network fusion.
Harvard Business School professor 
Michael Porter  argues there are  five 
competitive forces that  shape strategy  for 
business.  These forces consist  of the power  of 
suppliers,  consumers, rivals,  new  entries,  and 
substitutes.36  Understanding  how  the five 
forces shape strategy  provides companies 
with  a  competitive advantage for  profitability. 
I n  t h e g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e g o a l f o r 
understanding  these forces is to generate 
greater  public value.  By  applying Porter’s 
competitive forces to intelligence sharing, we 
gain insight  into how  we might strategically 
structure fusion  centers and use network 
fusion  to create a  stronger  system  for 
homeland security. 
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SUPPLIERS AND CONSUMERS
Suppliers and consumers have the power  to 
influence what is being reported about 
terrorist  plots, trends, critical  infrastructure 
vulnerabilities,  and the possible modality  of 
attack.  This information,  in  turn, will  affect 
decisions made at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels. Too often  suppliers of 
intel l igence use their  unintentional 
organizational  bias and affiliation  with  law 
enforcement  to tailor  intelligence for 
prevention,  which  leaves the first responder 
community  at  a  major disadvantage for 
reducing the consequences and the risk of 
responding  to terrorist  incidents.  Non-
traditional consumers of intelligence – those 
outside of law  enforcement  – are now 
requesting  different  forms of intelligence. 
Together,  suppliers and consumers set new 
strategic requirements for intelligence. 
Here are some examples o f how 
information  and intelligence for  all hazards 
are influenced by  suppliers and consumers to 
create public value.
• Policy  makers use strategic intelligence 
to decide how  best to equip first 
responders and systematically  position 
r e s o u r c e s .  A n  e x a m p l e o f s u c h 
intelligence is the strategic response to a 
terrorist  threat  involving  toxic industrial 
chemicals.  In  India  and Iraq, terrorists 
have used chlorine gas in  previous 
attacks. Understanding  this threat on  a 
strategic  level and knowing  the proximity 
o f industr ia l chemical p lants to 
Manhattan, the FDNY purchased two 
140-foot fireboats, specially  designed to 
protect their  crews from  chemical, 
biological,  radiological,  and nuclear 
(CBRN)  exposure while applying large 
volumes of water  to displace a  toxic 
chemical cloud. These fireboats act  as 
interagency  command platforms and are 
positioned to protect  the New  York–New 
Jersey  Harbor  region from  CBRN attacks 
and maritime threats.
• Operational intelligence is used for 
planning  and training  against  dynamic 
scenarios for  preparedness.  The aim  of 
intelligence for  operations is to increase 
public safety  by  mitigating  the effects of 
attacks. The advantage of multiple 
disciplines is to develop scenarios to help 
decision  makers deal  with  uncertainty  by 
considering alternate courses of action. 37 
These scenarios are not predictions of the 
future; rather, they  are vehicles that  assist 
people in  learning  about  alternative 
tactics.38  Scenario building  assists 
homeland security  in  identifying the blind 
spots in  its planning  process and 
developing adaptability  to deal with 
uncertainty.  One example of this 
advantage of information  sharing 
involves the analysis of the plot  to blow 
up the Buckeye Pipeline supplying  fuel to 
JFK Airport  in  New  York  City. Working 
closely  with  multiple agencies in  an 
intelligence briefing,  the FDNY  provided 
law  enforcement with  an  alternate 
location  for an  attack, which  had not been 
considered and was far  more damaging  to 
New  York City  airports.  Maps, geospatial 
photographs, and a  description of the 
pipeline were given  to security  partners, 
ind icat ing the p laces o f greater 
vulnerability. A  competitive advantage 
over  the terrorists was derived from  the 
network interaction  of first responders 
with  intelligence experts to create 
d y n a m i c s c e n a r i o s t h a t i d e n t i f y 
vulnerabilities in  addition to the 
investigation.
• Tactical Intelligence  is the timely  and 
accurate exchange of information  during 
an  incident. The power of network  fusion 
was seen  on January  15, 2009, when  US 
Airways Flight 1549  made an  emergency 
landing in  the icy  waters of the  Hudson 
River  in  New  York.  By  pulling  the list  of 
passengers and crew  from  the control 
tower  at LaGuardia,  and tracking  and 
cross-referencing  it  to the Emergency 
Medical  System  network  of people taken 
off the plane,  the FDNY  was the first  to 
know  that all  people on  this flight were 
safe and immediately  posted this on  the 
HSIN portal, which  connected to the 
emergency  management  cluster. This 
information  was pulled by  many  security 
partners including  the DHS National 
Operations Center,  and was given  to the 
secretary  of intelligence and analysis to 
brief the Secretary  of DHS and the 
situation room  of the White House. 
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Through  a  fusion  of data  points, 
information was shared in  real time 
across a  network  of homeland security 
partners.
RIVALRIES 
The federal government  has invested a  great 
deal of money  in  creating  liaison models for 
sharing  information  and intelligence. In 
1980, the Joint  Terrorism  Task Force (JTTF) 
was formed at the New  York  Office of the FBI 
with  NYPD. Over  the years this joint  venture 
has proved its worth  in  unraveling  terrorist 
plots and prosecuting  cases.  It represents the 
blending  of law  enforcement  agencies for 
counterterrorism  purposes.  Similarly, High 
Intensity  Drug Trafficking  Area (HIDTA) task 
force was created to share information. The 
DHS fusion  centers were designed to expand 
information  sharing  among  unconnected law 
enforcement  and non-traditional consumers 
of intelligence like the fire and health 
services. However,  many  of those overseeing 
funding are starting to wonder  if fusion 
centers duplicate the function  of the law 
enforcement model of JTTF. 
For  fusion  centers to have a  competitive 
advantage, they  will  need to develop a 
distinct  core competency  and improve their 
ability  to share information  faster, smarter, 
and cheaper.  To achieve these goals, public 
sectors must  strategically  position  their 
organization  to perform  different  activities 
from  rivals or  perform  similar  activities in 
different ways.39  The competitive advantage 
of fusion  centers lies in  their capacity  to 
connect to a  diverse group of agencies to 
share intelligence and information not only 
for  prevention  and protection,  but  also for 
mitigation,  response,  and recovery. Without 
such  competitive advantage, fusion centers 
could become extinct with  future budget  cuts, 
by  not  being  unique enough  to have 
substantial value. Network fusion  is the 
distinctive core competency  of fusion  centers, 
which  allows them  to connect  to multiple 
disciplines in  response to all threats and 
hazards.  The advantage is in  the ability  to 
exchange critical information  with  a  variety 
of senior  executives in real time by  not 
requiring  them  to be co-located. Through 
network  fusion  classified information is 
carried over  HSDN and is utilized not  only 
criminal investigations but  also for  all 
hazards.  
NEW ENTRANTS AND SUBSTITUTES
It is broadly  known  that  New  York  City  is 
considered a  prime terrorist  target  because of 
its iconic and economic status.  Yet, there are 
no plans for  a  NYC fusion  center. Analysis 
reveals several reasons for  this lack.  First  is 
the rivalry  that  a  fusion center  would create 
between  the Joint  Terrorism  Task Force and 
High  Intensity  Drug Trafficking Area  task 
force. Second is the new  entrance into 
intelligence by  the robust  intelligence and 
counterterrorism  bureaus of the NYPD, 
which  boast of more than  one thousand 
NYPD officers assigned to this work, 
including officers in  several international 
cities. 
The third and most  revealing  reason  is the 
emergence of network  fusion  as a  substitute 
for  a  fusion  center  in  New  York City. Through 
the connectivity  of HSDN the same type of 
classified intelligence that is shared with 
fusion  centers is exchanged directly  with 
NYPD. The police department is able to 
connect to DHS Intelligence and Analysis,  the 
National Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC), 
and bridge to the FBI and other  sources of 
intelligence. FDNY also was provided with 
HSDN to connect  to similar  types of 
intelligence. In  New  York City,  the police and 
fire departments that suffered great losses on 
9/11  and will  respond to the next  terrorist 
event, can  now  share classified information 
with  each  other  as well as the DHS, FBI, 
United States Coast  Guard, state fusion 
center  in  Albany,  NY, and centers and 
agencies in  surrounding states as well.   James 
Surowiecki  describes this aggregated 
knowledge as the “wisdom  of crowds,”  which 
is characterized by  diversity  of opinion  from 
independent  and decentralized sources. 40 
Network fusion  provides an  alternative 
means for  sharing intelligence with  multiple 
agencies responsible  for  protecting and 
responding to terrorism in New York City. 
The emergence of network fusion  could 
have a  similar  effect on  co-located models for 
intelligence (e.g.,  fusion centers) as 
Wikipedia  had on  encyclopedias.  After  244 
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years,  the printed copy  of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica was replaced by  a  digital  format.41 
Wikipedia,  with  its ability  to leverage the 
“wisdom  of crowds”  and Internet  availability, 
proved to be equally  accurate, faster, cheaper, 
and more widely  used than  the traditional 
encyclopedia.  Fusion  centers have the 
opportunity  to embrace the concept of 
diversity  through  network  fusion and make it 
their  distinctive core competency,  thus 
avoiding irrelevancy. 
PARADIGM SHIFT TO NETWORK 
FUSION
Network fusion is the  next evolution  in 
information  and intelligence sharing.  The 
objective of this approach  is to blend 
technology  with  social interaction  to 
understand threats and mitigate their  effects. 
S u c h  e m e r g e n t s y s t e m s c o n n e c t 
organizations to each other; this alters their 
behavior  in  response to the behavior  of other 
organizations in the network.42  The network 
effect  expands the capacity  of organizations 
to interact  with  each  other  and to recognize 
threats. Collective collaboration represents 
the  establishment of trust and personal 
relationships among clusters of police, fire, 
health,  and others to exchange information. 
To create such  a  shift  to a network  structure, 
leaders must prod organizations to develop a 
new  purpose, reengineer  operations, build 
broad support,  and restructure responsibility 
and accountability across organizations.43  
PURPOSE
Information and intelligence sharing  is 
defined in  the National Preparedness Goals 
as “the ability  to exchange intelligence, 
information, data,  or knowledge among 
Federal,  state,  local or private-sector  entities 
as appropriate.” 44 The more connection there 
is,  the greater  the chance for  discovering 
novel  and critical pieces of information. 
Unfortunately, this document  l imits 
intelligence and information  sharing  as core 
goals of prevention and protection  only. A 
new  purpose should include a  network fusion 
approach  that exchanges information for 
collective collaboration  across all  five mission 
areas:45
• Prevention: Information/intelligence 
supports efforts to avoid, prevent,  or  stop 
terrorist  attacks by  connecting  to 
different  sources to discover  novel 
elements of threats.
• Protection: Information/intelligence 
enhances homeland security  effects 
against man-made or  natural disasters by 
increasing awareness of vulnerabilities.
• Mitigation: Information/intelligence 
widens the understanding  of the threat 
environment,  which  enables people to act 
in  time to lessen  the effects of a  possible 
event.
• Response: Information/intelligence 
increases situational  awareness to 
support  an adaptive response to save life 
and property  in  a  dynamic  event. It  also 
shapes preparedness efforts of training, 
equipping, and exercising.
• Recovery: Information/intelligence will 
shorten  the time needed to restore a 
community to normal.
The purpose of sharing  within  a  network 
framework is to facilitate the exchange of 
useful,  relevant, and timely  information 
among  the entities that  need it,  ensuring  that 
the right  information will get  to key  decision 
makers in  a  timely  manner.  Instead of 
waiting for  information to be pushed, 
network fusion  also allows for  information  to 
be pulled and returned back  to the network in 
the form  of enhanced intelligence. As 
government  agencies move toward a 
sociotechnical network  approach for 
counterterrorism  and crisis management,  the 
effectiveness of such  an  approach will depend 
on  how  well  they  develop technology  and 
collaborative channels of communication 
with their security partners.  
REENGINEERING FOR NETWORK 
FUSION
In  a  networked world information moves 
quickly  across a  multichannel network  that is 
engineered to connect  individuals and groups 
to create a  broad understanding of the threat 
e n v i r o n m e n t . W i t h o u t  i n f o r m a t i o n , 
organizations cannot  fully  use their  skills to 
mitigate the threat  or the consequences of 
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terrorism. Fusion centers will  only  tap a 
small potential of information  sharing  by  co-
locating  partners, unless they  also connect to 
other partners through  network fusion. New 
York City’s experience with  network fusion 
illustrates how  key  city  agencies can  connect 
with  each  other  as well  as to the Department 
of Homeland Security, state fusion centers, 
the FBI,  and others in  the intelligence 
community. 
Reengineering  for  network fusion  requires 
a  sociotechnical approach  that  uses 
i n n o v a t i v e t e c h n o l o g y  t o f a c i l i t a t e 
collaboration  among  those tasked with the 
function of protecting  life and property.  The 
following  are some concrete steps that 
leaders can take to develop a  system  for 
network  fusion  and greater  information 
sharing.
Leverage Technology: To participate in 
network fusion  at a  classified level,  DHS will 
need to construct  a  secure room  or  Sensitive 
Compartmented Information  Facility  (SCIF) 
that is equipped with  HSDN, secure 
computer,  secure video conferencing,  secure 
telephone (terminal) equipment  (STE),  safe, 
printer, and shredder.  The room  and the 
equipment  will provide a  secure means to 
receive classified material and briefings.  
Identify Personnel: It is critical that 
organizations identify  those in  leadership 
positions who will benefit  from  classified 
reports and briefs.  Organizations that 
participate in  network  fusion must also 
commit  a team  that will  work  together  to 
analyze and produce intelligence products, 
thus adding value to the intelligence 
community.
Connect to  Intelligence and Information: 
Having  the equipment  and personnel to 
receive classified information is useless, 
unless the equipment  connects to usable 
intelligence and members have the tools to 
accomplish  their  work.  Network fusion 
creates a  web-like feature for  fusion  centers, 
which  connects organizations to secure 
intelligence sites.  To receive access to secure 
websites, agencies become an adjunct  to their 
state or  regional fusion  center.  In 2012, the 
New  York City  Fire Department became an 
adjunct  to the New  York State Intelligence 
Center  (the NYSIC is New  York’s Fusion 
Center)  and took  full  advantage of resources 
without  having  to travel to Albany.  The 
NYSIC and New  York  City  agencies are now 
partners. In  addition,  DHS created a  Fire 
Service folder  on  HSDN for  secure 
documents to be dropped or  as a place to 
request Fire Service input and analysis.
C o l l a b o r a t e w i t h O t h e r s : A s a 
sociotechnical  network, it  is expected that 
members will  interact  with  one another.  By 
looking  at intelligence from  different 
perspectives,  new  pieces of information  can 
be exchanged via  email. However, one of the 
most valuable means of collaboration  is the 
use of secure video teleconferencing  (S-VTC). 
DHS can  provide a  bridge for  a  weekly  (or 
when  needed) brief among New  York  City 
police and fire departments, the FBI, NYSIC, 
New  Jersey  Fusion  Center,  and other security 
partners. Since there is no time lost  in  travel, 
senior  executives are more likely  to attend a 
short  fifteen- to twenty-minute brief.  Video 
conferencing not only  produces a  common 
operating  picture,  it  also builds relationships 
and trust among security partners.
Support and Coach: Forming  a  network 
fusion  team  for  intelligence sharing requires 
an  additional  element that  is often 
overlooked.  Richard Hackman,  who 
researched collaborative intelligence at 
Harvard University,  stresses the need for 
DHS support in  terms of education  and 
expert  coaching. 46 DHS supports the need for 
members of an  analytical  team  to receive 
analyst  training  to increase their  skills.  DHS 
has also provided each  fusion  center  and 
those that are a  part  of network fusion  with 
an  intelligence and analysis analyst to assist 
in  the information  sharing process. Other 
expert  coaching  is also a  good idea  for 
creating  a  strong  analytical  team.  At  NYPD, 
highly  regarded intelligence experts head the 
Intelligence Bureau  and provide professional 
guidance.  At FDNY, intelligence experts 
attached to the Terrorism  Task Forces and 
Operations Center  supply  coaching  to foster  a 
higher-level competency.
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Network Fusion is a sociotechnical information sharing system designed to 
encourage collaboration across multiple disciplines by utilizing technology to connect 
voice, video, and data communications at classified and unclassified levels.
 Leverage Technology
With DHS, construct a secure room or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF) equipped with Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), computer, S-VTC, 
STE, safe, printer and shredder.
 Identify Personnel
Identify personnel who would receive classified information and train selected 
members to be part of an analytical team.
 Connect to Intelligence and Information
Link to Fusion Centers, as an adjunct agency, for access to intelligence and abide by 
the rules and requirement for handling classified information.
 Collaborate with Others
Partner with other agencies for exchanging information.
 Support and Coach
Receive DHS support, acquire clearances, educate analysts and provide expert 
coaching for understanding intelligence context.
Table 2: Implementing Network Fusion for Practitioners 
ACQUIRING LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT
Designing networked intelligence not only 
requires operational capacity  to connect 
networks,  but  also political support  found by 
proving  substantial value for  national 
security.47 Following  the 1993  bombing  of the 
World Trade Center,  FDNY  Fire Marshal 
Ronald Bucca  (who had a  security  clearance 
due to his participation  in  Army  Reserve 
Military  Intelligence), tried to represent the 
fire department  on the Joint  Terrorism  Task 
Force but was denied.  Based on  his access to 
military  intelligence he feared that terrorists 
would again target the World Trade Center. 
This fear  became a  reality  on  September  11, 
2001. Fire Marshal Bucca  was killed as he 
took  part  in  the rescue operation, but  his 
vision  for  FDNY to be part of the intelligence 
sharing  community  was realized.  Today,  two 
fire marshals are assigned full-time to the 
JTTF and high-ranking  fire chiefs are given 
clearances to attend classified intelligence 
briefings. 
The efficacy  of horizontal integration  of 
intelligence has been  proven  in  real-life 
situations.  In 2003,  there was a credible 
threat  against the George Washington  Bridge, 
which  connects New  York and New  Jersey.  A 
multiagency  brief was held concerning  the 
threat  and law  enforcement  devised a  plan  to 
protect  the bridge. The fire service,  a  weak tie 
to law  enforcement, brought  a  perspective of 
consequence mitigation  to the discussion and 
asked about the vulnerabilities of the 
structure. The Port Authority  of New  York 
and New  Jersey  sought  out  its engineers to 
brief the FDNY  fire chief,  who inquired about 
progressive bridge collapse. Once the answer 
to this serendipitous question  was known, it 
led to an  exchange of information,  which  in 
turn  led to the creation  of new  preventive 
guidelines, the revision  of preparedness 
plans, the relocation  of special resources for 
mitigation,  the  issuance of new  response 
protocols, and the purchase of new 
equipment.
This horizontal network  approach  enabled 
organizations to extend their  expertise and 
presence into areas not  traditionally 
associated with the intelligence community, 
thus filling a  hole in  security  plans. Including 
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mitigation  and response expanded the 
aperture of intelligence that previously 
focused on prevention and protection. 
Information  sharing  does not  stop with  a 
single threat. New  York  City’s Department of 
Transportation  (DOT),  aware of this threat 
against the bridges,  conducted a  study  with 
the US Army  Corps of Engineers and private 
consultants to understand the vulnerability  of 
its major  bridges. The study  produced 
thousands of pages of information  and was 
shared with  a  network of emergency 
responders including  law  enforcement. 
Unfortunately,  connecting  to volumes of 
technical  engineering  reports was useless to 
emergency responders. 
The FDNY asked DOT to support  the 
development of a  First Responder’s  Bridge 
Guide .  This was a secure document 
developed for  high-ranking  incident 
commanders to assist  in  their  making  critical 
decisions on  the stability  of the bridges. 
Incident commanders were now  armed with 
the knowledge of what would cause a  bridge 
to collapse. This information  could be moved 
wirelessly  across an  encrypted network to the 
decision  makers in  real time. The result  of 
this project demonstrates the power  of multi-
agency  support for  reengineering information 
structures to connect  different  perspectives 
about  the same threat and collaborate to 
produce a  fusion-supported decision  making 
document for first responders. 
In  2006,  the DHS chief intelligence 
officer, Charles Allen,  testified in  front of 
Congress: “to prevent  and counter  potential 
terrorist  attacks and other threats to the 
homeland,  first  responders and frontline law 
enforcement  officers must  be armed with  the 
information  that  will  enable them  first  to 
recognize and then  defeat  the threat.” 48 This 
tes t imony  publ ic ly  recognized f i rs t 
responders as a  legitimate part  of the 
intelligence networks,  which will enable them 
to better  fulfill their  role in  homeland 
security. 
THE FIRE SERVICE AND NETWORK 
FUSION
On the West  Coast,  California’s Terrorism 
Early  Warning  Group,  which  was the 
predecessor to fusion  centers,  invited the Los 
Angeles County  Fire Department to place 
battalion  chiefs as members of this team. In 
Washington, DC,  the Metropolitan  Police 
Department  refused to attend a  security 
briefing  at  the Capitol unless a  fire chief from 
DC Fire Department  was invited to attend. 
These efforts by  a  few  forward looking 
individuals paved the way  to recognizing the 
fire service as a security partner.
Under the direction  of Charles Allen,  the 
Office  of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 
started working  directly  with  the FDNY to 
form  an  information  and intelligence-sharing 
environment  for  the fire service.49 By  aligning 
the FDNY with DHS efforts to improve 
i n f o r m a t i o n  f l o w , t h e F i r e S e r v i c e 
Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) was created, 
which  provided a template for  DHS to share 
i n f o r m a t i o n a m o n g  m a j o r  c i t y  f i r e 
departments. 50 This initiative adheres to the 
mandate articulated in  the Intelligence and 
Terrorism  Reform  Act  and the presidential 
directives to create an information-sharing 
environment across the country.51
In  April  2010,  the DHS integrated the fire 
service into fusion centers and added an 
annex  for  the fire service into the baseline 
capabilities for Major  Urban and State Fusion 
Centers.52  The purpose was to establish  a 
direct  information  conduit between the 
United States Department of Homeland 
Security  and the fire service. Through  the 
sharing  of pre-incident  intelligence and real-
time incident  updates,  information  support 
for  both  the first  responders and DHS is 
enhanced.
In  2011, I&A,  with  Caryn  Wagner’s 
leadership,  provided FDNY  with  HSDN for 
greater  intelligence sharing,  which  was the 
foundation  for network  fusion. In  addition, 
the FDNY furthered the legitimacy  of the fire 
service within  the Department  of Homeland 
Security  by  setting  a  series of intelligence 
requirements. Fearful  that  terrorists might 
continue to use fire as a  tactic, the FDNY set 
detailed requirements for  the intelligence 
community  to search  for  possible chatter  on 
this topic. Discovery  of such  information 
would indicate advancements in  the use of 
fire as a weapon. 
In  2012, a  memorandum  of understanding 
for  network fusion  was signed between  FDNY 
and the New  York  State Intelligence Center 
(NYSIC) making FDNY an  adjunct  member  of 
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New  York State’s fusion  center. Legitimacy  is 
now  attained by  connecting  to a  platform  for 
exchanging  classified and unclassified 
information  in  real time with  senior  officials 
to prevent,  mitigate, and respond to a  range 
of threats.  The benefit of network fusion  is 
that  information  is not  only  pushed through 
briefings,  but  now  can  be pulled for  a  greater 
understanding  of the threat  environment. 
Connecting  to additional fusion  centers and 
other first responder  groups within those 
fusion  centers attains further  benefits of 
network fusion.
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez argues that when 
faced with  new  combinations of technologies 
for  terrorism,  homeland security  must take a 
d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t o s e c u r i t y .  H e 
recommends bringing  small groups together 
for  a  specific purpose, which  forms “ad-
hocratic”  organizations. 53 Just such  an  ad hoc 
committee was assembled with  FDNY  in 
response to a  detailed article in  the ninth 
issue of Inspire Magazine  (2012) that 
describes how  to use improvised incendiary 
devices to set wildland fires. Taking 
a d v a n t a g e o f n e t w o r k f u s i o n , D H S 
Intelligence and Analysis asked FDNY,  New 
York State’s fusion  center, and others to 
collaborate in  writing  an  awareness 
document of a  potential  terrorist  tactic that 
uses “fire  as a weapon.”  Collaborative 
analysis discovered that  such  tactics might 
also be used against  large populations in 
high-rise buildings.  The fusing  of information 
and network collaboration of ad hoc 
committees illustrates the fire service’s 
contribution to the intelligence process and 
the adaptability  of an  emergent intelligence 
network for understanding  the threat 
environment.
RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The emergence of networks prompts 
organizations to redefine their  core 
responsibilities, from  managing  only  their 
own  people and programs to coordinating 
resources and information  with  other 
agencies for producing  public value. 54  The 
focus now  is on  the mission  outcome of 
public safety  and not  simply  on  an  agency’s 
outputs. Integrating  the concept of network 
fusion  for  information  and intelligence 
sharing into organizations requires a 
management  system  capable of dealing  with 
“multiple locations, several different cultures, 
often  different  and incompatible information 
technology  systems, and sometimes 
deliberate withholding  of important 
information  when  partners perceive they  are 
in  competition  with  one another,  or  simply  to 
protect  bureaucratic  turf.” 55  The goal of 
network fusion is to connect  agencies as a 
force multiplier  for  gathering, analyzing, and 
disseminating  information  into the core 
mission of homeland security.
Homeland security’s use of network  fusion 
represents a balance between  anticipation 
and resiliency. A  strategy  of anticipation is 
the creation  of ties among  first responders, 
law  enforcement,  and the intelligence 
community  to better  understand the threat 
environment  for  prevention  and protection 
before an  event occurs. A  strategy  of 
resilience is the strengthening  of those ties 
for  mitigation, effective consequences 
management, and quicker  recovery  if attacks 
were to take place.
The FDNY has pushed to enhance 
information and intelligence sharing 
c a p a b i l i t i e s b y  f o r m i n g  n e t w o r k s , 
strengthening ties,  and using technologies to 
educate and train its members and to work 
with  other agencies.  The results of these 
efforts were evident  on May  1, 2010,  when a 
vendor  alerted police to a  possible vehicle fire 
in New  York’s Times Square. As police 
directed them  to the car, the firefighters 
noticed, “something  did not look right.” 56 The 
owner  of the SUV  was nowhere to be found; 
there was white smoke rather  than  black; a 
handheld thermal camera showed no sign of 
fire; and an odor  of fireworks emanated from 
the rear  of the vehicle. Firefighters asked 
police to run the license plates. When the 
plates came back  unregistered, the fire 
lieutenants concluded that the fire could be a 
car  bomb. The police and fire officers 
overcame their  organizational biases and 
collaborated with  each  other,  which  led to a 
decision  to evacuate  people from  the area. 
This decentralized approach worked because 
it  allowed organizations to deal with 
uncertainty  by  having  multiple agents (street 
vendors,  firefighters,  and police officers) fuse 
information  to find the best  solution.57 Later 
reports determined that  the SUV  had the 
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potential of being  a  powerful terrorist bomb 
with  lethal consequences. Organizations and 
individuals were accountable to one another 
to share information and collaborate.
POLICY FOR NETWORK FUSION
Network fusion  is composed of flexible and 
innovative systems capable of adapting to the 
complexity  of today’s threat environment. 
Organizations that  can  rapidly  exchange 
intelligence and critical information will 
operate more effectively  than  less prepared 
organizations at  complex  incidents. 58 Failure 
to develop network  fusion will leave first 
responders and fusion  centers to combat 
terrorism  with  l imited information. 
Overcoming organizational bias and 
consequence mitigation  neglect  will foster a 
synergistic network that  combines the 
knowledge of law  enforcement  and the 
intelligence community  with  first  responder 
organizations to form  a  robust  information 
and intelligence-sharing  platform.  Network 
fusion  does not replace fusion  centers, but 
e n h a n c e s t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t y  t o s h a r e 
information  and intelligence.  The stirring 
images of 9/11  and a  system  still blinking red 
with  stovepipes that  failed to share 
information  illustrate the need for  better 
information  and intelligence sharing  among 
agencies before and during a crisis.
Network fusion is an  emergent  process 
that  connects the unconnected by  bridging 
gaps in  information  and intelligence sharing. 
The challenge is to get those who control 
information  to see that hoarding  information 
is not  a  way  of attaining power; sharing 
information  with  the unconnected attains 
that  power  in  a  networked world.  Network 
fusion  extended to other  at-risk  cities and 
organizations will enhance homeland security 
and fusion centers’ efforts by  making them 
faster, smarter, and more cost-effective in 
exchanging information  and intelligence. 
Network fusion is faster  because information 
and intelligence can be exchanged directly 
with  many; smarter  because there is a  pull 
and push  of different  perspectives; and more 
cost-effective because DHS does not  have to 
pay  for  representatives to be co-located.  The 
question  we must  face today  is whether we 
have taken  sufficient  steps to ensure a  policy 
of network fusion to repair  an  information 
sharing system that was “blinking red.”
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